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ONE OF THE STRIKING PECULIARITIES ABOUT early modern wars is how intractable they
were. Designations like “the Thirty Years’ War” and “the Eighty Years’ War” surely
make the point adequately. One of the most extreme cases in this regard is the
French Wars of Religion (1562–1598), in which the later Valois kings fought Protes-
tants and radical Catholics.1 Historians have struggled to find a conceptual frame-
work to clarify this complex narrative. The wars have traditionally been divided into
eight numbered conflicts, which can be mind-numbing even for specialists.2 The wars
are also famous for their horrifying massacres and assassinations, including the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572), the most iconic act of religious violence in
early modern Europe.3
Some of the older scholarship has portrayed the wars as a series of largely identi-
cal clashes that continued to reignite because France’s Catholics simply refused to
accept the existence of an organized Protestant movement in the country. As Pierre
Miquel put it, “The Wars of Religion were not a civil war . . . [The conflict] was mer-
ciless, pitting man against man. Its goal was not to dominate the adversary, but to
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1 The standard recent overviews of the wars are Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–
1629 (Cambridge, 1995); Robert J. Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562–1598 (New York, 2000); and
Arlette Jouanna et al., Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion (Paris, 1998). See also Denis Crouzet,
Dieu en ses royaumes: Une histoire des guerres de religion (Seyssel, 2008); Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu: La
violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525–vers 1610, 2 vols. (Seyssel, 1991); and Olivia Carpi,
Les guerres de religion, 1559–1598: Un conflit franco-français (Paris, 2012). The study of violence in the
French Wars of Religion has also had enormous influence because of Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites
of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France,” Past and Present, no. 59 (1973): 51–91, re-
printed in her Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays (Stanford, Calif., 1975), 152–188.
The article’s impact was recently reviewed in Graeme Murdock, Penny Roberts, and Andrew Spicer,
eds., Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France, Past and Present 214, supple-
ment 7 (2012).
2 The First War lasted from March 1562 to March 1563; the Second from September 1567 to March
1568; the Third from August 1568 to August 1570; the Fourth from October 1572 to July 1573; the Fifth
from March 1574 to May 1576; the Sixth from December 1576 to September 1577; the Seventh from No-
vember 1579 to November 1580; and the Eighth from March 1585 to April 1598.
3 Arlette Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State, trans.
Joseph Bergin (Manchester, 2013), is an excellent recent treatment.
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destroy it, to reduce it—as the inquisitors did—to ashes.”4 Older works also harshly
condemned the last members of the Valois dynasty—Francis II (b. 1544, r. 1559–
1560); King Charles IX, a minor at his accession (b. 1550, r. 1560–1574); and King
Henri III (b. 1551, r. 1574–1589)—for their failure to end the wars. All three kings,
but especially Charles, were heavily influenced by the queen mother, Catherine de
Médicis (1519–1589), the widow of King Henri II (r. 1547–1559). She was positively
demonized in some older accounts. While the later Valois kings and Catherine have
traditionally come in for harsh criticism, the Protestant leader Henri of Navarre, later
King Henri IV (b. 1553, r. 1589–1610), is the traditional hero of the story because he
successfully ended the wars in the 1590s.
R. J. Knecht, in his judicious recent survey of the Wars of Religion, comments
that explaining their duration is particularly difficult. Nonetheless, he argues that
they lasted so long for three reasons. For one, the state and its revenue-raising appa-
ratus were too weak to repress heresy effectively. In particular, the later Valois kings
had great difficulty raising and paying for armed forces to repress the Huguenots.5 In
addition, the various royal edicts that attempted to end the conflict were “but com-
promises grudgingly conceded” that satisfied no one. And finally, the many massa-
cres and assassinations of the period embittered the parties: “The wars were also
fuelled by certain acts of violence which they generated.”6
Some of the reasons why ending the wars was so difficult in this period seem intu-
itively obvious. As Knecht notes, sixteenth-century French kings had far less control
over their subjects than later monarchs and modern European states. France was a
violent society at the time—recent studies suggest that murder rates in sixteenth-
century Europe were comparable to those in the most violent Latin American and
Caribbean nations today.7 Religious motives also embittered the conflicts, making it
harder for the parties to consider negotiated settlements. For example, religious zeal-
otry inspired both Jacques Clément and François Ravaillac, the assassins of King
Henri III and King Henri IV.8 But while endemic violence and strong religious emo-
tions helped fuel the Wars of Religion, they do not help explain why the wars finally
ended, and they provide little pattern, shape, or structure for the conflict.
Theories that might provide insight into the shape of the wars and why they
ended when they did have been developed as part of the political science literature
of war termination. Since the end of World War II, although deaths in wars have de-
4 “La guerre des religions n’est pas une guerre civile, comme celle des Armagnacs et des Bour-
guignons. Elle est inexorable, elle dresse l’homme contre l’homme. Elle n’a pas pour but de dominer
l’adversaire, mais de le détruire, de le réduire—comme le font les inquisiteurs—en cendres.” Pierre
Miquel, Les guerres de religion (Paris, 1980), 22. Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu, 2: 111, suggests that some
of the provincial Saint Bartholomew’s massacres may also have been intended to exterminate the Protes-
tants, through either death or conversion.
5 James B. Wood, The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in
France, 1562–1576 (Cambridge, 1996).
6 Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 292–294, quotations from 293, 294.
7 Pieter Spierenburg, A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the
Present (Cambridge, 2008).
8 Peacemaking in the French Wars of Religion has attracted considerable interest recently; see
Michel de Waele, Réconcilier les français: Henri IV et la fin des troubles de religion (1589–1598) (Quebec,
2010); Penny Roberts, Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars, c. 1560–1600 (Basingstoke,
2013); and Jérémie Foa, Le tombeau de la paix: Une histoire des edits de pacification, 1560–1572 (Limoges,
2015). N. M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, Conn., 1980), uses the vari-
ous edicts of pacification as the backbone of its narrative, and gives the texts in an appendix.
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clined, civil strife has dramatically escalated. Some contemporary civil wars—in
Congo (Kinshasa), for example—have seemed as interminable as the French Wars of
Religion, and many have also been exacerbated by similarly sharp ethnic and reli-
gious divisions. Consequently, many scholars, policymakers, and employees of non-
governmental organizations have searched very actively to understand how best to
end such conflicts. Historians tend to be suspicious of models that purport to explain
all civil wars, regardless of time and place. But looking at the literature of other aca-
demic disciplines is frequently helpful because it allows us to get a different perspec-
tive on the problems we examine. And just because a model may not be universally
applicable does not mean that it is not helpful for a particular case.
Models from political science suggest three conclusions about the French Wars
of Religion. First, they came to an end because there was a “learning curve.” At the
beginning of the wars, in the later 1550s and early 1560s, many Catholics wishfully as-
sumed that the Protestant movement was small and weak, and with God’s help it
could easily be crushed. At the same time, French Protestants, based on the recent
miraculous successes of their movement (which proved that they were God’s Elect),
confidently hoped to convert the whole country. Both sides were to be disappointed.
Second, in the mid-1570s, a fragile peace emerged: the Saint Bartholomew’s Day
Massacre taught enough of the belligerents that they could not eliminate their oppo-
nents. They accepted a compromise that guaranteed Protestants personal security
and limited rights of public worship, but put a ceiling on Protestant numbers. This
peace also allowed Henri III to embark on a major reform program. As Mark Green-
grass has commented, “In retrospect, it is possible to see that the French kingdom
might have emerged very differently in the early seventeenth century.” This negoti-
ated peace was inherently fragile, but the wars could well have ended after the Peace
of Bergerac in 1577. However, Bergerac was upended when the Valois line became
extinct in 1584, making the Protestant leader Henri of Navarre the heir presumptive.9
Third, the peace that Henri IV brought about in 1598 was more stable than that of
1577 because he was not seen as a biased mediator (unlike Charles IX, Henri III,
and Catherine), but rather as a victor with a particular conciliatory style that came
out of his previous experiences as the leader of the minority Protestant movement.
The terms of the Edict of Nantes, however, were extremely similar to those of the
Peace of Bergerac.
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE IDENTIFIED TWO REASONS why wars can be difficult to end
that seem relevant to the Wars of Religion. First, the parties may not have accurate
information about each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Political scientists com-
monly look at war as a form of negotiation or bargaining, and conceptualize wars as
the result of a lack of adequate information. If each side could accurately assess its
strength relative to the other, they would come to an agreement. Unfortunately, lead-
ers have a tendency to overestimate their abilities, and therefore to reject compro-
9 Mark Greengrass, Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576–1585 (Ox-
ford, 2007), 365; H. G. Koenigsberger, “The French Succession and the War with England,” in The New
Cambridge Modern History, vol. 3: R. B. Wernham, ed., Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution, 1559–
1610 (Cambridge, 1968), 294–318, here 295, also notes the pause in the conflict.
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mise.10 From this perspective, wars are learning experiences, and they end when bat-
tles prove which side is the stronger to both sides’ satisfaction. Another reason why it
can be difficult to end a war is that it may be hard for the warring parties to absorb
the lessons of their experience. Even if those on one side learn that theirs is the
weaker party, as Dan Reiter has emphasized, they may still be reluctant to settle if
they do not believe that the other side will abide by the agreement. They may feel
forced to continue fighting despite poor performance on the battlefield.11 A peace
agreement is meaningless without enforcement mechanisms. Barbara Walter has ar-
gued that external mediators are crucial to ending civil wars, because parties will not
agree to a peace that they do not believe can be enforced.12
In addition to these general considerations, there are some beliefs specific to the
period that helped prolong the Wars of Religion because they prevented the parties
from gaining an understanding of their situation. Sixteenth-century understandings
of the role of the monarchy, for instance, inhibited compromise. Many Catholics
were initially reluctant to accept a compromise peace because they believed royal
rhetoric that exaggerated the king’s power and his ability to dictate the course of
events. For example, in 1564, Charles IX went on a tour of France to pacify the
country.13 He was fêted with elaborate pageantry. In Lyon, he was greeted as a new
Josiah, the biblical king of Judah, able to purify the nation despite his youth.
Onlookers were assured that “all power and dominion is ordered and established by
God, which [power] we must obey, not only out of fear, but for conscience; especially
since whoever resists it, contradicts Divine authority.”14 The judges of the Paris
Parlement (France’s highest court) had even more reasons to resist compromises
that suggested Charles IX was unable to enforce the law after seeing the king clothe
himself in such heroic garb.
Religious beliefs also made the parties reluctant to admit the need for compro-
mise: many French Catholics and Protestants expected God to intervene to ensure
that the righteous side would win. In 1560 the Dominican Pierre Dyvolé prophesied
that “ruin and desolation would soon come because of the Huguenots, seditious re-
bels against God, the crown, and the public tranquility of France.”15 Given that many
French people believed that God actively intervened in this world to protect His
church, it was essential that heresy (or papist idolatry) be eliminated before divine
wrath brought disaster to the kingdom. Those sixteenth-century French people who
10 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3
(Summer 1995): 379–414.
11 Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J., 2009), 15, and more generally chap. 3.
12 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.,
2002).
13 Jean Boutier, Alain Dewerpe, and Daniel Nordman, Un tour de France royal: Le voyage de Charles
IX, 1564–1566 (Paris, 1984).
14 Discours de l’entree de tresillvstre, trespuissant, treschrestien, & tres-victorieux Prince Charles de Valois
neufuiéme de ce nom Roy de France, en sa trescelebre & fameuse ville de Lyon, faicte le treziéme iour de
Iuin, Mil cinq cens soixante quatre (Lyon, 1564), f. Aiii. In French: “toute puissance & domination est
ordonnee & etablie de Dieu, à lqauelle il faut obeir, non seulement pour la crainte, ains pour la consci-
ence: d’autant que qui luy resiste, contredit à la volonté Divine.” I found this reference via Roberts,
Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars, 98–99.
15 Cited in de Waele, Réconcilier les français, 54–55. In French: “prophetisa à la France sa ruyne et
desolation proche à advenir par iceux huguenotz et seditieux rebelles contre Dieu, la coronne et le repos
public de France.”
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believed that God and King had the power to bring about victory must have found it
hard to assimilate the information coming from the battlefield and to come to a just
appreciation of their position.
Still, as Reiter’s model suggests should have occurred, there does appear to have
been a slow learning process for both sides in the early stages of the Wars of Reli-
gion. At the outset, many Catholics grossly overestimated their strength. Many would
have agreed with Blaise de Monluc, a great writer and notable captain in Guyenne
(southwestern France), who insisted in late March 1562 that “whatever some might
say, the [Protestant] religion is so inferior in the number of men that it is no more
than one-tenth the size of the Catholic in Guyenne, so that should one wish to exter-
minate it, it could easily now be done.”16 This assessment was quite wrong: Guyenne
was one of the great Protestant strongholds. One indication that Catholics initially
had poor knowledge of the two religions’ relative strength was that at the outset of
the wars in 1561–1563, they were prepared to massacre Protestants without thinking
about the risks that this policy entailed. These massacres were concentrated in the
upper Garonne region around Toulouse and in a broad belt south and southeast of
Paris.
Massacres are clear markers of poor information, and as Stathis Kalyvas has ar-
gued, such “indiscriminate violence” is therefore particularly common at the begin-
ning of a civil war.17 The massacre at Wassy, perpetrated by men under the
command of the Duke of Guise, is perhaps the most famous of the mass killings of
this period, and traditionally labeled as the opening salvo of the wars. Massacres ac-
tually began at least three months before Wassy, in Carcassonne and Grenade. The
violence was frequently heavily ritualized. At Carcassonne, a Protestant source re-
ports that “Guiraud Bertrand [a Protestant] was also inhumanely killed, and [after-
ward] one of the rioters split open his mouth with a dagger and then put the bit from
a bridle inside, and a book in his hands.”18 It is possible that Protestants declared
war after Wassy, rather than previous massacres, because Guise’s leadership of the
massacre there convinced Protestants that there was an organized campaign to elimi-
nate them, rather than just a series of isolated random incidents. But Catholics did
not see the dangers: when Guise entered Paris, he was acclaimed as a “second
Moses.”19
If some Catholics initially assumed that they could kill Protestants with impunity,
they soon learned otherwise. After papal troops from Avignon massacred Protestants
in Orange, Protestants seized the chateau of the village of Mornas and massacred
16 Memoires de Condé, servant d’éclaircissement et de preuves à l’Histoire de M. de Thou: Contenant ce
qui s’est passé de plus mémorable en Europe, 6 vols. (Paris, 1743), 3: 184. In French: “Ladicte Religion
[Protestante] (quoyqu’on en dye) est si inferieurre de nombre d’hommes audict Paı̈s de Guyene, à celle
de l’Eglise Romaine, de plus de la dixme partye; tellement que qui la voudroit exterminer, on le pourroit
encores maintenant aisement faire.” I found this reference via Roberts, Peace and Authority during the
French Religious Wars, 61.
17 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 2006), especially chap. 6. For a
list of all the massacres, see my article “Massacres during the French Wars of Religion,” Past and Present
214, supplement 7 (2012): 100–126, here 106–108.
18 Théodore de Bèze, Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées au royaume de France, ed. G. Baum
and Ed. Cunitz, 3 vols. (Paris, 1883), 1: 964. In French: “Guiraud Bertrand y fut aussi inhumainement
tué, auquel un des seditieux fendit la bouche avec une dague & puis luy mit un mords de bride dedans,
& un livre entre les mains.”
19 Jouanna, Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion, 110.
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the inhabitants, shouting, “Kill, kill! Let them pay for Orange!” They dumped the
bodies into a boat, which was set adrift to float down the Rhône toward Avignon
with a message attached to it reading: “O you people of Avignon! Let these mer-
chants pass, since they have already paid duty at Mornas.”20 As a result of this and
similar incidents, Catholic massacres of Protestants declined precipitously after
Charles IX signed the Peace of Amboise in 1563. To some extent, massacres may
have declined because minority religious communities learned to defend themselves
or leave the area. But in many cases they remained in place, and vulnerable to at-
tack—in Rennes and Bordeaux, for example. It seems more reasonable to infer that
perpetrators concluded that massacres were ineffective or worse—the Bordeaux au-
thorities in particular were well aware that Henri of Navarre’s troops were close at
hand.21 In short, as political scientists would have predicted, Catholics learned.
Although after 1563 Catholic forces learned the costs of perpetrating indiscrimi-
nate violence, many Catholics were still highly reluctant to acknowledge explicitly the
possibility that the Protestant heresy would become a permanent feature of French
society. The Parlement of Paris refused to register the Edict of Amboise. The Parle-
ment’s first president, Christophe de Thou (father of the great historian Jacques-
Auguste de Thou), insisted that the edict contained provisions that in effect autho-
rized two religions in France, “which would utterly break and destroy society, for reli-
gious unity is the ligament of states.”22 He saw Catholicism as a crucial glue; only the
elimination of heresy could permanently end the conflict. Mack Holt concludes,
“While the aims of those like the Queen Mother and Michel de l’Hôpital to pursue
peace through religious toleration rather than persecution are commendable, they
were unrealistic in the 1560s (though by that time a renewal of the repression of
Henri II would not have been any more effective).” As Holt describes it, Catherine
de Médicis, the leading figure in Charles IX’s government, faced an impossible task:
she and her advisers were unable either to repress Protestantism or to force Catho-
lics to accept a compromise with Protestants. While Holt’s argument has some merit,
“unrealistic” is perhaps too strong. Although the Parlement of Paris refused to regis-
ter the Edict of Amboise, Catherine was able to push through registration at a num-
ber of other provincial parlements—and violence did end. As Knecht concludes,
“The policy of limited religious toleration pursued by the French government since
March 1563 [the date of the Edict of Amboise] seemed to be working quite well. By
January 1567 France was more or less at peace.”23
If by 1563 many Catholic militants had learned to moderate their tactics, Protes-
tants had not learned to moderate their demands and trust their opponents. Reiter’s
20 Gustave Lambert, Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530–1598), 2 vols. (Toulon, 1870),
1: 159–161. In Provençal: “O voi d’Avignone! Lasciate passare questi mercanti, perche an pagato il dazio
a Mornas.”
21 Jean Meyer, ed., Histoire de Rennes (Toulouse, 1972); Robert Boutruche, ed., Bordeaux de 1453 à
1715 (Bordeaux, 1966), 249–250.
22 Édouard Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris: De l’avènement des rois Valois à la mort d’Henri
IV, vol. 2: Période des guerres de religion de la Ligue et de Henri IV (Paris, 1913), 32–33. In French: “dont
la société sera entièrement violée et dissolue, l’unité de religion étant le lien des États.”
23 Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 193; Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 133. Roberts, Peace and
Authority during the French Religious Wars, 33, goes so far as to say that “the Edict of Amboise instituted
the most extended, and arguably the most successful, peace prior to that heralded by the Edict of Nantes
at the end of the century.”
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argument that parties will not sign agreements that they believe will not be enforced
seems particularly relevant here. Protestants started most of the eight wars, but they
frequently had very good cause—the later Valois kings could not prevent massacres,
enforce peace agreements, or punish Catholic violators. In 1567, however, the Prot-
estants, driven by hope and insecurity, started the Second War of Religion without
an actual casus belli. In 1565, Catherine de Médicis went to Bayonne to marry her
daughter Elizabeth to King Philip II of Spain. Philip did not attend in person, so the
Duke of Alva took his place at the ceremony. The Dutch revolt broke out in 1566,
and Philip sent the Duke of Alva from Italy to the Netherlands with an army to sup-
press it. His route necessarily passed along the entire French border with the Holy
Roman Empire. Protestants worried that Catherine de Médicis’s decision to hire
6,000 Swiss mercenaries was part of a plot concocted with the Duke of Alva to de-
stroy them. This highlights the importance of Walter’s point that external mediators
can be crucial. In the Wars of Religion, no trustworthy external mediator was avail-
able because Charles IX and Catherine were deeply implicated in the conflict.
Instead, Protestants pinned their hopes on seizing control of the court and convert-
ing the young king, and with his influence the whole country, to Protestantism. Pos-
sessed of The Truth, they could not understand why Charles would not convert to
their religion. In 1567, Protestants anxious about Alva and Catherine tried to kidnap
the king while he was traveling near Meaux, despite all of Catherine’s efforts to con-
ciliate them over the previous four years.24 Protestants also staged a series of massa-
cres of their own. The most famous of these, called the Michelade, occurred in
Nı̂mes, where contemporary sources record upwards of one hundred deaths. The
massacre was led by a junta called the “Messieurs,” consisting of virtually all of
Nı̂mes’s Protestant political leaders. Jean de Sauzet, one of the Messieurs, still felt
that only total victory was an acceptable outcome. Explaining why the Messieurs
ordered the destruction of nearly every Catholic church in town, he is reported to
have said, “The nests must be destroyed so that the birds will not return.”25 Catholic
counter-massacres of Protestants followed in the wake of these attacks.
The later Valois kings functioned as biased mediators, able to offer carrots to
both Catholics and Protestants, but sticks only to the latter. They were reluctant to
punish Catholics who broke peace agreements because Catholics were the over-
whelming majority of the population, and France’s king and queen mother agreed
with Catholic forces that in an ideal world, there would be no Protestants in France.
Many Catholics may have been dissuaded from using massacres as a tactic after the
massacres of 1561–1563 failed to destroy Protestantism in France. But some Catho-
lics were still tempted by it because of the unique circumstances of 1572, when the
24 This was actually their second attempt. In 1560, Protestant noblemen became convinced that
Francis II was caught in an echo chamber at court where he could not have a proper opportunity to hear
the Protestant message, so in 1560 they attempted to kidnap him. See Henri Naef, La conjuration
d’Amboise et Genève (Geneva, 1922).
25 On the “surprise at Meaux,” see James Westfall Thompson, The Wars of Religion in France, 1559–
1576: The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II (Chicago, 1909), 318–321; on the massacre in
Nı̂mes, see Allan A. Tulchin, “The Michelade in Nı̂mes, 1567,” French Historical Studies 29, no. 1 (2006):
1–36. The de Sauzet quote comes from a contemporary deposition: Archives Départementales du Gard,
G 442, fol. 97v. In French: “il falloit tumber le nid affin q[ue] les oyseaulx ne y retournassent.” For an ex-
ample of a Catholic massacre of Protestants in Auxerre, see Olivier Jacques Chardon, Histoire de la ville
d’Auxerre, 2 vols. (Auxerre, 1834, 1835), 1: 228–233.
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bulk of the Protestant leadership gathered in Paris for the royal wedding of Charles
IX’s sister Marguerite de Valois to Henri of Navarre. Charles IX, the Protestant
leaders, and many subsequent historians have concluded that the Duke of Guise was
responsible for the attempted assassination of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, the Prot-
estant leader, on August 22, 1572. But the king, the queen mother, and the council
preferred to massacre Protestant leaders rather than punish the duke.26 Royal policy
in the Wars of Religion was somewhat contradictory: Charles IX and Henri III nego-
tiated compromises while frequently insisting that Protestantism was a heresy that in
principle should be illegal. Of course, perfect consistency was impossible in the pe-
riod 1559–1589, since there were three kings and many officials and noblemen com-
peting to influence them. Nonetheless, there was consistency in at least one respect:
no king was ever willing to execute Catholic murderers of Protestants. Had the later
Valois kings been willing to punish Catholic groups that committed massacres, Cath-
olics would surely have learned to behave themselves more rapidly.27 On the other
hand, the Protestant movement could not be crushed; nor could it be prevented from
resorting to war when the alternative was massacre at Catholic hands. It should also
be noted that despite her biased position, Catherine de Médicis was a master negoti-
ator, and her skills undoubtedly helped reduce the violence.28
BY THE LATE 1560S, MOST IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS would have concluded that Protestant-
ism was never destined to become the majority religion in France. At the same time,
the movement survived the Saint Bartholomew Day’s Massacre, which at least in ret-
rospect strongly suggests that the resources to eliminate Protestantism did not exist.
One of the reasons why so many Protestants were killed during that wave of violence
was that they thought it unlikely that Catholics would attempt a massacre right after
the king and queen mother had staged an elaborate royal wedding that enacted na-
tional reconciliation. However, the Protestants also no longer expected Catholics to
use a tactic whose efficacy had already been found wanting. In any case, Protestant
survival after 1572 proved that massacres did not work: they virtually ceased thereaf-
ter. Most infuriating for Catholics, the Protestant position even seemed to improve.
Royal forces soon found themselves facing a Protestant army twice their size, with
the king’s own brother and heir presumptive, François Duke of Anjou (1555–1584),
among its leaders.
The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre thus paradoxically led both sides to rec-
ognize that total victory was impossible, and made peace more likely. Although Cath-
olics refused to abide by the Peace of Monsieur (1576), the first peace signed after
26 Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 89–106. Note that Jouanna’s interpretation is dif-
ferent from the one proffered here.
27 This paragraph skips over the complicated and contentious question of who, exactly, was behind
the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre. Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 128, argues that the
Parisian crowd committed the massacre on its own because of a “tragic misunderstanding” of a remark
by the Duke of Guise. I believe Guise was more deeply involved. But in any case, no one doubts that
Catholics were the killers.
28 See, for example, Denis Crouzet, “Catherine de Médicis actrice d’une mutation dans l’imaginaire
politique (1578–1579),” in Didier Boisson and Yves Krumenacker, eds., La coexistence confessionnelle à
l’épreuve: Études sur les relations entre protestants et catholiques dans la France moderne (Lyon, 2009),
17–50.
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Saint Bartholomew’s, it did largely abide by the second, the Peace of Bergerac
(1577). Even Monluc, who at the start of the wars had called for the immediate exter-
mination of the Protestants, wrote a long “Discours” in 1573 in which he urged the
king to allow the Protestants to observe their faith, and to bring the wars to an end.29
As Michel de Waele concludes, “From 1577 to 1584, France lived in relative calm.”30
There was one very limited outbreak of civil war, the Seventh War of Religion, in
this period, but as Mack Holt agrees, it was “the shortest and least significant” of
them. As Holt emphasizes, there were also a number of peasant revolts, but these
were confined to the southeast, and in any case peasant revolts were endemic under
the Old Regime.31 The peace was fragile, but it was real.
When the provisions of the Peace of Monsieur are compared to those of the
Peace of Bergerac, it seems clear that Catholics defiantly rejected the first but grudg-
ingly accepted the second because, although Bergerac permitted Protestant worship,
it put tight boundaries around Protestant growth. Of all the agreements signed in the
sixteenth century, the Peace of Monsieur was the most favorable to the Protestant
cause. If that was not enough to make many Catholics reject it, they also felt that its
provisions did not accurately reflect the balance of power between the parties.
Rather, they were convinced, as indeed was Henri III, that he had signed the peace
because he felt temporarily constrained by the mutiny of his brother Anjou.
Although the Peace of Monsieur did not give Protestants full equality (for example,
it called Protestantism the “so-called Reformed religion”), the provisions were none-
theless generous. Protestants obtained freedom of worship everywhere in France
with the exception of Paris and its immediate environs. To prevent discrimination in
the courts, they were given special chambres mi-parties (bipartisan tribunals) in every
Parlement, a major conceptual innovation. They also obtained eight lieux de sûreté
(places of safety)—towns where they were permitted to maintain their own private
armies. Moreover, the peace also included a provision calling for a meeting of the
Estates-General. This provision backfired. Protestants had long believed in constitu-
tional government, and they had organized a campaign in 1561 to demand regular
meetings of the Estates. However, Catholics secured a clear majority in the elections,
and used the Estates to disrupt the peace.32
By contrast, the Peace of Bergerac prevented France’s Protestants from building
more than a handful of new churches. It retained most of the text of the Peace of
Monsieur, with the crucial exception that it permitted Protestant worship only in pla-
ces the Protestants held as of September 17, 1577, plus one town per bailliage (an ad-
ministrative district roughly the size of a modern département). Since most bailliages
29 Solange Deyon, “Blaise de Monluc, la guerre, la paix,” Bulletin de la société de l’histoire du protes-
tantisme français 150, no. 2 (2004): 245–256, cited in Roberts, Peace and Authority during the French Reli-
gious Wars, 122.
30 De Waele, Réconcilier les français, 73. For a different point of view, see Holt, The French Wars of
Religion, 111, who argues that after the Peace of Bergerac, “if [Henri III] was unable to sustain a war
long enough to defeat the Huguenots, he was equally incapable of maintaining peace for any extended
period.”
31 Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 111–116, quotation from 116.
32 On 1561, see Noël Valois, “Les essais de conciliation religieuse au début du règne de Charles IX,”
Revue d’histoire de l’Église de France 31, no. 119 (1945): 237–276; on 1576, see Mack P. Holt, “Attitudes
of the French Nobility at the Estates-General of 1576,” Sixteenth Century Journal 18, no. 4 (1987): 489–
504.
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already had at least one Protestant church, this second provision did not really per-
mit any Protestant growth.33 Protestants could no longer hope, nor Catholics fear,
that the majority of the population would convert to the new religion. Only four of
the chambres mi-parties were retained, but the subsequent success of the peace sug-
gests that Catholics had learned at a fundamental level that religious uniformity was
incompatible with political unity or social peace.
The best evidence that contemporaries thought that peace was at hand is in the
recent magisterial book Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French King-
dom, 1576–1585, by Mark Greengrass. He shows that Henri III and Catherine used
the period of peace after 1577 to undertake extensive efforts to reform France’s insti-
tutions. They worked to end inflation, passed the Ordinance of Blois (the most im-
portant legal reform of the century) in 1579, sent out commissioners to inspect local
officials, and began a process that was supposed to lead to the end of the sale of of-
fices. Contemporaries understood that such desirable reforms could not succeed
without peace, and indeed a major reason the king and queen mother undertook the
program was that they knew that all the parties desired the reforms. The reforms
were the carrots that would get the parties to accept the peace.34 Had Henri III and
his brother Anjou not died without heirs, the fragile peace could well have taken
hold.
IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE WARS OF RELIGION could have ended in 1577, why did they not
do so, and why did they finally end in 1598? Monica Duffy Toft’s work suggests that
the 1577 settlement had an inherent weakness, and Henri IV had an inherent
strength that the later Valois kings lacked. One of Toft’s key contentions is that ne-
gotiated settlements to civil wars break down far more frequently than when one side
wins. She concludes that this occurs because in order for a negotiated settlement to
last, each side must face both carrots and sticks for violating the agreement, and ne-
gotiated settlements commonly offer only carrots: “well-intentioned third parties
who are interested in facilitating enduring peace must consider adding credible en-
forcement mechanisms—a threat of harm—to any cease-fire or peace agreement.”
Of course, a “credible enforcement mechanism” usually means that there must be
armed military and police forces capable of punishing defectors. When one side
wins, by contrast, its security forces are usually capable of punishing the other side if
it tries to get out of the agreement.35 In the subset of cases where one side won, Toft
compares conflicts in which the government won to those in which insurgents won.
She concludes that when insurgents prevailed, outcomes were distinctly better for
the countries concerned: twenty years later, those countries were less likely to have a
33 Since there were only about 86 bailliages in France, and approximately 20 million inhabitants, a
bailliage on average had a population of somewhat less than 250,000, On the number of bailliages, see
Roger Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle (Paris, 1948), 171. No precise French popula-
tion figures exist, but the standard source is Jacques Dupâquier, Histoire de la population française,
4 vols. (Paris, 1988). On the number of French Protestant churches, see Philip Benedict and Nicolas
Fornerod, “Les 2150 ‘églises’ réformées de France de 1561–1562,” Revue historique 311 (2009): 529–560.
34 Greengrass, Governing Passions.
35 Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.,
2010), 43.
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renewed outbreak of conflict, they scored higher on an index of democracy, and eco-
nomic growth was slightly higher as well. She argues that insurgents frequently make
up for their inferior assets by trying to mobilize broad community support. When
they win, they tend to bring a more open style of decision-making to the govern-
ment.36 Toft’s model cannot be used here without modifications: she presumes a
two-sided struggle between the “government” and “insurgents,” while the French
Wars of Religion were at least three-sided, as are many modern civil conflicts—but
her argument about insurgent style seems relevant.
The death of Anjou disrupted the structural arc of the wars. Instead of a continu-
ing peacemaking process, the key questions were immediately reopened, and the
whole cycle began again, with even more viciousness since everyone thought they had
been settled. The Catholic League, which had been quiescent since the Estates-Gen-
eral of 1576, enjoyed a renaissance and developed into the biggest political organiza-
tion in the country, with powerful aristocratic patronage capable of challenging
Henri III. Catholics were determined to unite because it appeared possible that
France could turn Protestant, since Henri of Navarre, the leader of the Protestants,
was now the heir presumptive. Catholic political theorists suddenly reversed their po-
sitions and began to write in favor of the right of resistance to tyrants; Protestants be-
gan to preach obedience to kings. The Eighth War of Religion, particularly in the
period immediately after Henri III’s assassination, witnessed some of the most sus-
tained and bloody fighting of the period. As de Waele puts it, the situation “put
France face to face with a fundamental contradiction.”37 Furthermore, the new situa-
tion dramatically reduced Henri III’s ability to influence events, since both the Prot-
estants and the Catholic League were bound to wait to see what would happen after
his death and Henri of Navarre’s accession. In 1588, Henri III, in extreme frustration
and desperation, ordered the killing of Henri, Duke of Guise, and his brother, the
Cardinal de Guise, before being himself assassinated the following year. Thus it is
reasonable to divide the Wars of Religion into two groups: the first seven, which led
slowly to a fragile peace, and the eighth, which lasted as long as the first seven com-
bined, but which led to a firmer peace based on similar principles. In the short term,
Catholics decided on war when Henri of Navarre became the heir presumptive; in
the medium term, Henri IV proved to be in a better position to make peace than ei-
ther Henri III or Catherine.
In addition to upsetting the Peace of Bergerac, when Henri of Navarre became
the heir presumptive of Henri III and then Henri IV, he went from being the leader
of an insurgent party to being the head of the government. It is true that this legiti-
macy was contested: his League opponents argued that he had no right to be king,
since the pope had excommunicated him and declared him unfit to rule; even Henri
III’s position was somewhat unstable, for the same reasons—the pope and the Sor-
bonne had declared him unfit as well. But on the other hand, Henri of Navarre was
next in line to the throne, and Henri III, before dying of his wounds, named him his
heir. Many of Henri IV’s troops were Catholic, and under considerable pressure
36 Ibid., 62–69. My analysis in this and the next paragraph was improved by conversations with Hilary
Bernstein.
37 De Waele, Réconcilier les français, 85; Jouanna, Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion,
241, 253.
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from public opinion, in 1593 he converted to Catholicism. His position gave him con-
siderable legitimacy. The Catholic League was more plausibly the insurgent party in
this phase of the wars.
Nonetheless, Henry IV continued to use a different, less authoritarian style than
Henri III, similar to what Toft suggests is typical for insurgent victors. His reign was
also notably successful at bringing peace, and with it improved living conditions, for
the country. Henri’s informal, warmer style arguably stems from his previous experi-
ence as the leader of an insurgency. When the Paris Parlement sent a delegation to
him to protest against registering the Edict of Nantes (1598), just as they had with
the Edict of Amboise a generation earlier, Henri pointed out to them:
You see me in my study, where I have come to speak to you, not dressed in royal attire
with sword and cape like my predecessors, nor like a prince who has come to speak with
foreign ambassadors, but dressed in a simple doublet, like the father of a family speaking
intimately with his children. What I have to say to you is that I want you to verify the
edict.38
Fundamentally, Henri IV was giving the judges an order, but he couched it in a way
designed to soften that fact, and to distinguish himself sharply from his predecessors.
This is the kind of language Henri had learned to use when he had to negotiate with
the fissiparous towns and synods of the Protestant movement. It also may stem from
a tradition of noble revolt where high nobles claimed to be acting in defense of tradi-
tional liberties.
Although many aspects of the Wars of Religion are contentious, analyses of
Henri IV’s policies after his conversion are in accord: Henri triumphed above all by
being generous to his former enemies. For example, the Duke of Mayenne is re-
ported to have received 3,580,000 livres tournois, Claude de la Châtre 900,000 l.t.,
and the Duke of Lorraine 3,766,825 l.t. Most surveys cite Henri IV’s minister the
Duke of Sully, who stated that Henri spent 32,000,000 l.t. on bribes given to League
leaders.39 Towns that submitted had their privileges extended and their taxes re-
duced. Noble former members of the Catholic League were also rewarded with high
office, sometimes to such an extent that old friends of the king felt slighted. Occa-
sionally, rebellious towns such as Laon and Amiens had to be given rough medicine,
to serve as examples to others.40 This also meshes well with Toft’s model.
Toft’s model might need modification, however, in one other respect. It was cer-
tainly reasonable for Henri to try to appear to be generous, but given that the royal
finances were in dire straits at his accession, there were also good reasons to limit his
generosity. Sully used very rough measures to bring the royal budget into line. Cred-
itors were forced to wait almost indefinitely (until they died, if possible), the interest
rates on their loans were arbitrarily reduced, and they were offered repayment of
principal only if they would agree to discount it severely. Henri IV had a reputation
for being a cheapskate compared to his predecessors (except when it came to his mis-
tresses). Jacques Bongars, the French ambassador to the German princes, did not
38 Quoted in Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 167.
39 Jouanna, Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion, 398–399.
40 On Laon and Amiens, see ibid., 394 and 406, and more generally S. Annette Finley-Crosswhite,
Henry IV and the Towns: The Pursuit of Legitimacy in French Urban Society, 1589–1610 (Cambridge,
1999).
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get paid for twenty years.41 In short, Henri’s policy was to proclaim his munificence
while in reality he was most reluctant to actually pay up.
A crucial piece of evidence showing the basic solidity of the 1577 settlement is
that Henri IV essentially adopted its provisions in the Edict of Nantes. Crucially, the
edict provided that Protestant worship could take place only in those cities where it
had occurred in August 1597, plus in two towns per bailliage and on noble estates.42
The former Protestant leader Henri IV was barely more generous to the Protestants
than the Catholic Catherine, probably because he calculated that French Catholics
would not stand for much more. Nantes, like Bergerac, put a ceiling on French Prot-
estant aspirations. Public life in France remained essentially Catholic, and if Henri
IV did not force his Protestant subjects to convert, he certainly used moral suasion
and the force of his own example to encourage them to do so. The Edict of Nantes
in popular memory represents a monument of toleration, but this is a myth and does
not capture the edict’s true importance. Rather, although Henri IV, like all six-
teenth-century monarchs, had continuing difficulties asserting his authority, he
achieved in the Edict of Nantes a lasting peace.43
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE CAN HELP US step back and gain greater conceptual
clarity about the shape of the Wars of Religion, why they lasted so long, why they fi-
nally ended, and on what terms. Over the course of the wars, there was in fact a
learning curve whereby the parties gradually gained a better understanding of each
other’s strengths. This then led to a quasi-peace between 1577 and 1584, which was
weak but might have held had Henri III not been childless. In addition, Henri IV’s
victory was more likely to endure than a victory by the Catholic League or a negoti-
ated truce because Henri had a more open political style shaped by his previous ca-
reer as head of an insurgency. The peace settlement and Henri’s conversion limited
Protestant political aspirations. It also encouraged diehard Catholics to continue to
hope that eventually the state might grow strong enough to eliminate heresy from
the realm. Despite Henri’s more open style, his victory helped re-burnish the ideal of
the absolute monarchy.
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